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Boise, ID 83701
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
EDWARD A. DOLLMAN,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 43671
CANYON COUNTY NO. CR 2015-9001
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Edward Dollman appeals, contending the district court abused its discretion when
it imposed and executed his sentence. Even the prosecutor recognized that, at some
level, Mr. Dollman’s actions in this case were impacted by his age (eighteen) and
associated immaturity. As such, the district court’s decision to forego a rehabilitationfocused sentence based on its unfounded conclusion that such a sentence would
be “wasting resources” constitutes an abuse of its discretion.

Therefore, this Court

should remand this case for a new sentencing determination, or, alternatively, reduce
Mr. Dollman’s sentence as it deems appropriate.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
When he was in fourth grade, Mr. Dollman was diagnosed with attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),
p.10.)1 The medications he was prescribed were not particularly helpful, and so, an
individual education plan, which included participation in special education classes, was
developed instead. (PSI, p.10.) With that plan in place, he was able to overcome
emotional issues surrounding his diagnosis and earn his high school diploma.
(PSI, p.9.)
However, he still exhibited symptoms of an anti-social personality disorder, as
well as signs of immaturity (such as poor impulse control) during that time. (See PSI,
pp.51, 62-63.) These problems compounded as Mr. Dollman went through puberty. As
a preteen, he was exposed to his elder step-brother’s pornography collection. (PSI, p.6.)
Soon thereafter, and partially due to his emerging sexual curiosity, he molested his
younger half-brother. (PSI, p.6.) The matter was handled in juvenile court proceedings
and resulted in Mr. Dollman completing a court-ordered residential sex offender
treatment program. (See, e.g., PSI, p.56.)
Nevertheless, Mr. Dollman continued to struggle with his attitudes toward sex.
(See PSI, pp.12, 51.) That culminated when he entered into a sexual relationship with
S.M.

(See PSI, p.3.)

He claimed he thought she was 16 years old, though she

asserted she told him she was only 13.

(Compare PSI, p.56; with PSI, p.3.)

Regardless, he was ultimately charged with injury to children. (R., pp.18-19.)
PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file
“Dollman PSI #43671.” Included in this file are the PSI report and all the documents
attached thereto (police reports, the psychosexual evaluation, etc.).
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Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty as charged.

(See Tr., p.5,

Ls.13-25.) However, the State agreed to recommend a period of retained jurisdiction in
light of the results of the court-ordered psychosexual evaluation (PSE).
Ls.12-20.)

(Tr., p.27,

The PSE evaluator determined Mr. Dollman presented a high risk to

reoffend based on his antisocial personality disorder, poor impulse control, high sex
drive, and other pro-offending attitudes. (PSI, p.51.) Defense counsel pointed out that
several of these concerns appeared to be related to Mr. Dollman’s continuing
immaturity, and asserted his prospects in that regard would get better with time and
continued programming. (Tr., p.41, Ls.13-21.)
To that point, the PSE evaluator had concluded that Mr. Dollman was moderately
amenable to treatment. (PSI, p.77.) He also identified several factors which could help
reduce the risk Mr. Dollman presented, including his pro-social support network, his
interest in pro-social activities, the fact that he had apparently not been abused growing
up, and the fact that he did not have a history of substance abuse. (PSI, p.72.) The
GAIN-I evaluator reached a similar conclusion in regard to Mr. Dollman’s history with
drugs, (which was some experimentation with marijuana) – he did not present a
substance abuse disorder. (PSI, pp.13, 33.) Rather, Mr. Dollman qualified for early
intervention treatment to prevent such issues from arising. (See PSI, p.42.)
As such, defense counsel recommended the district court impose a
rehabilitation-focused sentence (either a period probation or of retained jurisdiction) so
as to foster rehabilitation and maturation in Mr. Dollman, though defense counsel
acknowledged that process would take time. (Tr., p.40, Ls.22-25; Tr., p.41, L.22 - p.42,
L.12.)

The prosecutor also admitted that the reason Mr. Dollman had only been
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charged with injury to children in this case was based on the recognition that this sort of
situation often arises because the defendants “are very immature, and their immaturity
has led them to gravitate towards some of these younger [partners] who bear out the
same maturity level that they do,” and accordingly, as those defendants mature, the risk
they pose drastically diminishes. (Tr., p.37, L.12 - p.38, L.1.)
However, the district court rejected defense counsel’s recommendation based on
its conclusion that “I think that would just be spinning wheels and wasting resources.”
(Tr., p.43, Ls.22-24.) It also asserted that, even if it did retain jurisdiction and the rider
staff recommended probation, it “probably wouldn’t follow [such a recommendation] in
any event.” (Tr., p.44, Ls.6-8.) As such, it imposed and executed a unified sentence of
ten years, with two years fixed. (Tr., p.44, Ls.11-12; R., pp.51-52.) Mr. Dollman filed a
notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.53-54.)
ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed and executed
Mr. Dollman’s sentence.
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed And Executed Mr. Dollman’s
Sentence
In order to reach a reasonable sentencing decision, the district court needs to
weigh the objectives of sentencing in light of the defendant’s character. State v. Miller,
151 Idaho 828, 835 (2011); see also I.C. § 19-2521.
important aspect of understanding his character.

The defendant’s age is an

As Idaho’s appellate courts have

recognized, a younger offender should be treated more leniently because he is still
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maturing, and so, he has a higher potential to rehabilitate and become a productive
member of society. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v. Dunnagan,
101 Idaho 125, 126 (1980); Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008);
State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988). This is particularly true when, as
the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, evaluation of the offense
and defendant’s character reflects “‘unfortunate yet transient immaturity,’” as opposed to
the far more rare “‘irreparable corruption.’”2 Montgomery v. Lousiana, ___ U.S. ___,
136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (quoting Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455,
2469 (2012) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005))).
Mr. Dollman falls squarely under these cases. He had just turned eighteen when
the alleged offense occurred. (PSI, pp.1, 24.) Additionally, as defense counsel pointed
out, several of the factors the PSE identified as troubling are indicative of Mr. Dollman’s
still-maturing character. (Tr., p.41, Ls.13-21; compare PSI, p.51 (noting Mr. Dollman’s
poor impulse control, high sex drive, and “pro-offending” (i.e., irresponsible) attitudes
toward sex as concerning factors.) Even the prosecutor acknowledged Mr. Dollman’s
immaturity, citing it as the reason he had been charged with injury to children, instead
of, potentially, lewd and lascivious conduct. (Tr., p.37, Ls.12-23.) In situations like this

While the United States Supreme Court cases were discussing this factor in terms of
juvenile offenders facing sentences of life without parole, the factor remains relevant for
defendants like Mr. Dollman who, though they are no longer juveniles, are still
displaying the immaturity that concerned the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Brief for the
American Psychological Association, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners in
Graham v. Florida [130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010)], 2009 WL 2236778, at 12 (referencing
Jari-Erik Nurmi, How Do Adolescents See Their Future? A Review of the Development
of Future Orientation and Planning, 11 Developmental Rev. 1, 28-29 (1991); Laurence
Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80 Child
Dev. 28, 30, 35-36 (2009)) (explaining that a young person’s character and ability to
appreciate the consequences of their actions continues to develop into early adulthood).
2
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(a defendant of Mr. Dollman’s age having consensual intercourse with a person a few
years younger) the defendants “are very immature, and their immaturity has led them to
gravitate towards some of these younger [partners] who bear out the same maturity
level they do.” (Tr., p.37, Ls.12-23.) The prosecutor also acknowledged that, as people
like Mr. Dollman grow up and mature, the risk they present drastically diminishes.
(Tr., p.37, L.24 - p.38, L.1.)
Nevertheless, the prosecutor also sought to distinguish Mr. Dollman as an
exception to this rule based on his inability to conform his behavior after his first round
of treatment in this regard. (See Tr., p.38, L.19 - p.39, L.17.) However, as defense
counsel pointed out, maturation does not occur overnight; it takes time, which means it
may take a little longer for the lessons to take root and change Mr. Dollman’s behavior.
(Tr., p.40, Ls.22-25.)

Mr. Dollman participated in his first sex offender treatment

program at the relatively-young age of fourteen. As he is still only nineteen (see PSI,
p.1), the district court had the opportunity to take the time necessary for the maturation
process.

For example, by retaining jurisdiction, Mr. Dollman could participate in a

different treatment program which could reinforce those lessons from the first program
or provide additional information from a different perspective to help the lessons take
root and change Mr. Dollman’s behavior.

In other words, a rehabilitation-focused

sentence would help Mr. Dollman continue to grow away from the immature, impulsive,
and irresponsible attitudes and behaviors highlighted in the PSE and learn to be a
mature adult. This is the ultimate point the Idaho Supreme Court and United States
Supreme Court have recognized in promoting more lenient sentences for younger
offenders.
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In fact, the PSE shows that rehabilitation is, indeed, possible in Mr. Dollman’s
case. It noted that he had a pro-social support network to help him. (PSI, p.72.) He
has interests in pro-social activities. (PSI, p.72.) He has no apparent history of abuse
in his past. (PSI, p.72.) He has no history of substance abuse issues. (PSI, p.72.)
Rather, what he has is a history of immature experimentation with drugs. (See PSI,
p.13.)

As such, he qualifies for early intervention treatment to help prevent him

developing a substance abuse issue.

(PSI, p.42.)

These facts all point to the

conclusion that Mr. Dollman is capable, with proper and timely intervention, of halting
that problematic conduct. In fact, his history bears that out: he earned his diploma after
an individual education plan was put into place to help him learn, though his years in the
school system, to deal with the issues surrounding his ADHD diagnosis. (PSI, pp.9-10.)
Thus, while it may take time and effort, the facts about Mr. Dollman’s character show
that such investments should pay off.
With that understanding of Mr. Dollman’s character, the district court’s abuse of
discretion becomes clear. It refused to impose a rehabilitation-focused sentence on the
idea that such a sentence “would just be spinning wheels and wasting resources.”
(Tr., p.43, Ls.23-24.) That conclusion flies in the face of the information in the record
and the Idaho Supreme Court’s discussions about defendants like Mr. Dollman – they
are precisely the type of defendants in whom the system should invest those resources
because they are the most likely to benefit from them.
In fact, the district court’s statements suggest that it has given up on
Mr. Dollman, indicating it is of the opinion that he would not be able to rehabilitate: “in
the unlikely event that there was some other report or request for probation, I probably
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wouldn’t follow it in any event.” (Tr., p.44, Ls.6-8 (emphasis added).) However, as the
United States has repeatedly made clear, that perspective is dubious at best: it is the
rarest of young offenders who actually displays such irreparable corruption and
permanent incorrigibility. See, e.g., Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (explaining this was
the basis for its prior decisions in Miller, Roper, and Graham). As discussed supra, the
record is clear that Mr. Dollman is not that rare case. (See, e.g., PSI, p.77 (concluding
Mr. Dollman presents a moderate amenability to treatment).) Thus, the district court’s
sentencing decision to forego rehabilitative opportunities based on its unfounded
conclusion that rehabilitative efforts would be pointless in this case constitutes an abuse
of its discretion, and this Court should remedy that error.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Dollman respectfully requests that his case be remanded to the district court
for a new sentencing hearing. Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce his
sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 14th day of March, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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